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When ‘Interplay is the Content of the Work’—a Response to Nicholas Brown’s Autonomy 
 
I hold the anachronistic, but still familiar, mid-century view that everybody still invested in creating a 
civilization in which human beings are not only vectors of power competing for dominance, but also 
engaged in projects oriented toward shared meaning, has to defend against the almost total dilution 
and absorption by spectacle of whatever comes near it. (Spectacle in its classic definition, the reader 
will recall, is the image realm where “commodity fetishism... reaches its absolute fulfillment.” (Debord, 
26) Everything precious or strongly motivating or beautiful can be turned into a dumb image of itself—
a profaning reduction to a few simple 
effects that insults the intelligence and 
dulls the capacity for sensuous 
understanding of whomever looks at it.  
This repeated collapse into image has 
been accepted as a fact of life since the 
1960s, and most art made since then has 
registered this fact in some way, whether 
negatively, ironically, or with celebration. 
Nevertheless, I am wary of artworks that 
speak the language of spectacle too well, 
or otherwise foreground their commodity 
status, even when the artists who make 
them articulate intelligent critical 
intentions for their work (as in the case of Hito Steyerl, for example). It is hard for me to see where 
performance of symptom ends and self-conscious realism begins, and the symptoms themselves seem 
to risk a potentially unredeemable capitulation to the thin excuse for public social form that spectacle 
offers. Is not the right strategy to confidently defy spectacle with what it thinks it has killed? Or at the 
very least refuse to spend our energy learning well enough to cleverly riff on the elaborate systems of 
codes that constitute the commodity form’s constraining, difference-embracing language? 
Well, like the field of contemporary art that he takes as his subject, Nicholas Brown’s answer to this 
question in Autonomy: The Social Ontology of Art Under Capitalism (2019) is “No.” In keeping with the 
way art history since 1960 has played out, Brown agrees that artists must risk performing their 
imbrication with the market—anything else denies the pervasiveness of the commodity’s 
instrumentalizing logic in the capitalist economy in which we are all steeped and from which there is no 
escape. But Brown’s argument distinguishes itself from most contemporary art and criticism, and 
implicitly urges people who think like me to consider the possibility of a less enervating path forward 
than refusal. Brown’s book offers a framework for singling out and affirming the rare work of art that 
embraces its commodity status in order then to negate it and assert its autonomy from the commodity’s 
instrumentalizing logic. It does this by making prominent and available formal features that belong only 
to the work of art because they have no function outside of it. In this response, I offer an understanding 
of Brown’s criteria for judging contemporary art that I have come to agree with and appreciate, but also 
what would need to be added in order for it to be a more convincing and trustworthy critical system for 
me. My reservations hinge on the fact that the dialectics of art include qualities, or the qualitative, and 
quality must be placed on an equal footing with idea, not subordinated to it. Otherwise, we are only 
symptomatically performing our capitalist age’s quantification and abstraction of value. 
In Brown’s words, a work of art asserts its autonomy by demonstrating that it is a “self-legislating 
artifact,” which means “its form is intelligible, but not by reference to any external end” (31). In other 
words, art’s form reveals the ways it is contained within a set or system of formal decisions that may 
be in dialogue with the conventions (the history) of the medium or genre, but they are not determined 
by any purpose or demand brought to it from outside the work. All works of art possess such autonomy—
itis key to their definition as art—but Brown favors works that foreground their own formal autonomy, 
even thematize it, over works governed by other kinds of goals such as representing the way something 
in the world looks as accurately as possible or getting the viewer to interact with the art object in a 
particular way (pull a handle, say, or walk a maze). Such goals are shared with other human enterprises 
like biology or mechanical engineering, and thus do not point to what is special about art. Art’s 
specialness, its ability to stand for, by concretizing, the possibility that another logic besides the leveling, 
instrumentalized logic of the commodity even exists today is of crucial political importance for Brown. 
The most compelling quality in a work of art is 
usually at the site of a meeting of the artist’s 
intention and the material she did not create. 
Denying the importance of the ways the world’s 
particularity shows up in art — taking its place as 
a crucial part of the form — is like giving the 
whole realm of sensuousness and feeling over to 
spectacle, over to the logic of the commodity, 
because the profiteers are so good at 
manipulating us with it. 
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It is our only hope if we are to keep pushing from the left for another economic principle than the 
monolithic one we have. 
My favorite example in the book of an artwork that showcases its own autonomy is Jørgen Leth’s film 
The Perfect Human (1968), in which two performers do ordinary things in fascinatingly particular ways 
within a tightly controlled formal schema that determines setting (a plain white room), cinematography 
(only fairly long takes allowed), and genre (the voice over sounds like one from an ethnographic 
documentary).  
My least favorite example of an emphatically autonomous work of art, though helpfully illustrative of 
Brown’s point, is Charles Ray’s Hinoki (2007), an extremely detailed copy of an enormous dead oak tree 
lying down, carved in light red cypress wood by Japanese artisans trained to replicate deteriorating 
wooden monuments. The sculpture reveals its status as an intended form rather than a natural one 
because several chunks of cypress were required to simulate the original oak, and the places where 
they are joined together are prominently visible in the final sculpture. I’ll return to my reasons for not 
favoring this work below. 
The reason the assertion of formal autonomy by works of art is so important today, Brown argues, 
is that it models “a taking of sides” against the commodity, from which, again, “emancipation” is not an 
option (181). Such works of art insist on the possibility of a meaning separate from the capitalist market 
in a world in which all other institutions that govern and support the generation of meanings in public 
social life—our governments, schools, and museums, for example—“justify themselves, as best they 
can, with reference to the market, which means they are subordinate to the market, even when they in 
principle regulate it” (181-182). In the contemporary world, we explain the worth of everything we and 
others do in terms of its ability to bring us in proximity to wealth. (I recently learned the term “wealth 
adjacent,” used by museum professionals today—again, accepted as a fact of their lives, at times with 
a certain pride). We in university humanities departments feel the limits of such a criterion keenly, as 
the value of the skills we teach are nearly impossible to assess in dollar amounts.  
I feel a kinship between Brown’s Autonomy and my own book, The Concrete Body (2016), at the 
level of our work’s motivations. My book argues that the most important aspect of the performance art 
works made by Yvonne Rainer, Carolee Schneemann, and Vito Acconci in the 1960s is not that they 
collapsed the boundary between art and life when they used the ordinary body as a material, but rather 
that they continued to make art even though they were using a material that pushed the quality of 
literal, nonart presence in their work to an extreme limit. In spite of initial appearances, their 
performance artworks were in keeping with an older, modernist model at a time when this model was 
being rejected on the basis of its connection to elitist wealth and its being too abstract and not sensorially 
immediate enough. Immediacy, like “popular culture,” was associated with “lowness,” and identification 
with “lowness” was rapidly displacing working- and middle-class consciousness, to the benefit of 
capitalism’s highest earners. I did not use the word “autonomy” very often in my book, but I was 
certainly trying to show the ways each artist’s formal schema (designed in accord with their varying 
ideas about unifying social abstractions like everydayness, sensuous understanding, or public desire) 
shaped their found (or otherwise uncontrolled) materials in a way that “calls for an interpretation” 
(Brown 4). How they structured the work is key to the work’s meaning, in other words. To not consider 
these structures, and only attend to the immediate realness of the body, is not to understand the work’s 
positive assertions alongside its negations and performance of symptoms. In this area, Brown and I 
affirm contemporary works of art for similar reasons.  
Where my critical judgment of autonomy is different from Brown’s is the much bigger role I give to 
material particularity and other forms of contingency in my understanding of why the works of art I find 
compelling are compelling. For Brown, these aspects must be clearly “subordinated to the logic of the 
work” (222), whereas for me, the form’s ability to work with or through or adapt to the contingencies 
of materials and genre is a criteria for its trustworthiness as a form. A form that does not seem to take 
the constraints that lie outside of the artist’s or the discipline’s control into account feels suspicious to 
me. It seems naively enamored with its own abstract system, potentially brittle and isolated. 
Formulating the structuring abstraction of course takes intelligence, training, and discipline, and 
absolutely has value in itself, but to stop at the blueprint phase puts off until some unspecified future 
point the hard work of negotiation between the many concrete levels on which social meaning also plays 
out in practice. For me, the best art does not wait; rather, the version of such work that happens in an 
artist’s engagement with physical materials is essential to its thought.  
In spite of this difference in our critical values, nearly all of the examples in Brown’s book that I am 
familiar with strike me as smart and trustworthy in their engagement of both a strong structure and a 
nuanced feeling for particularity and texture. Ben Lerner’s 10 04, Bertolt Brecht and Kurt Weill’s 
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Threepenny Opera, Leth’s films that I already mentioned, and David Simon’s The Wire all conform to 
my understanding of modernist, Marxist dialectics, too. Only Ray does not.  
In Ray and in Brown’s account of Ray, “The idea becomes a machine that makes the art,” to quote 
Sol LeWitt’s foundational definition of conceptual art back in 1967, and any materiality in the work has 
to be broached with ironic distance, or quoting Lewitt again, “in a paradoxical way” (83). For many art 
historians, conceptual art’s discursive episode has always felt symptomatically limited—the artistic 
expression of subjects irrevocably damaged by spectacle’s traumatizing barrage of lies about the 
sensuous dimension of meaning (Meltzer; Stimson). Like the conceptual artists, Ray makes it seem as 
though he has defensively forgotten what moderns in the early twentieth century understood deeply: 
that any idea is immediately vulnerable once one begins trying to execute or realize it in the world. Ray 
lets nothing of this vulnerability of ideas show. The artist pursues forms; the sculptures resemble things 
and people in the world but they are approached in an objective way rather than as a subject with a 
feeling body and desires would approach them, drawing upon that subject’s experience of flourishing 
and of suffering. Based on conversations with Ray, Hal Foster once compared Ray’s recent work to 
sarcophagi and mummy cases — coffins, I would add, for the burial of complex public feeling.1 We know 
of course that Ray had a process involving his own felt motivations, a negotiation of shared terms, and 
the overcoming of physical obstacles, but all signs of or for any such living practice are sealed away 
beneath a hard, flawless shell. Most of the sculptures in his 2015 exhibition at The Art Institute in 
Chicago began with a photograph that was digitally turned into a mold for casting the work, the surface 
then polished and etched with mechanical exactitude. Even when the labor is performed with hand tools, 
as in Hinoki, it is a positivist copy and intentionally devoid of interpretation. As when in the presence of 
minimalist cubes, we are left alone with our own feelings by Ray’s work, our own private appreciation 
of the objective qualities on display in this impressively executed but ultimately very reduced aesthetic 
experience. In keeping with his own historical conditions, Ray’s work feels even more symptomatic than 
minimalism of the double-down on the privatization of feeling by the liberal art-buying class in the late 
capitalist neoliberal economy. The rich with humanities educations today seem to like being told they 
do not have to bring their feelings into public. If they did, the conversation that their guilt, aggression, 
and exhilarating access to freedom and pleasure would generate might motivate the building of new 
structures and move the culture toward new kinds of strength, rather than remaining stuck competing 
at the animal-power levels of force, charisma, and capacity for accumulation. Indeed, members of the 
globally wealthy class have supported Ray’s art generously. In my seven years in Chicago, I have never 
seen a show at the Art Institute with as much empty real estate dedicated to it as the Ray show. 
Differences of opinion about Ray aside, I wonder if we might think of Brown’s (and my) investment 
in the category of art generationally. For a while now I have been trying to think about how the insights 
and teachings of the “Sixties generation” (those whose sensibility was formed in equal parts by a training 
in modern European thought and the anti-institutionalism of 1968) were received and adapted by those 
who took them as their mentors. Generational relationships enter Autonomy’s discussion in the dynamics 
between Lars von Trier and Leth that become the brilliant subject of von Trier’s film The Five 
Obstructions (2003). Leth (born in 1937) belongs to the Sixties generation. Von Trier was born in 1956, 
a late baby boomer, but he is young enough to be an “admirer” of Leth, and to devote considerable time 
and energy to “sabotaging” Leth’s film The Perfect Human in The Five Obstructions (Brown 154). Leth 
was unknown to me before reading Autonomy, and he came as a welcome revelation, as I have had to 
work fairly hard to draw out a Marxist dialectical understanding of art from Sixties generation artists 
and mentors (Rainer, Acconci, and Schneemann figure as examples of course, but also to some extent 
my own beloved mentor T.J. Clark). This has been challenging because in writing they themselves tend 
to emphasize the negative, critical, concrete, or “low” side of their work more than the abstract ideas, 
positive proposals, and desires contained within its equally strong formal structures. For von Trier to 
know he wants to mess up the dialectic of Leth and push it toward the side of the “wounding, errant 
detail” (155) is a useful fact, because it means he functions as one of the younger proponents of the 
contemporary push to refuse the dialectical thinking of modern critical theory coming out of the 
Enlightenment tradition, in favor of an anti-formal anti-institutionalism born in reaction to the gradually 
increasing imbrication of democratic states with the profit-oriented priorities of capitalism’s highest 
earners since the nineteenth century. The older Sixties generation may talk this talk as well, but they 
never push the dissolution of boundaries or the negation of conventions to the point where it takes over 
the work. As Brown foregrounds, Leth poses the dialectics in his work against what Leth refers to as von 
Trier’s “Pure romanticism” (156). Brown explains: “Where von Trier wants to move Leth from ‘the 
 
1 Charles Ray Panel Discussion, with panelists Anne Wagner, Michael Fried, Hal Foster, and Richard Neer, The Art 
Institute of Chicago, May 2015. 
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perfect’ to ‘the human,’ understood as opposed conceptions of the work of art, Leth wants to use the 
opportunity to crank up the dialectic between ‘the perfect’ and ‘the human,’ between universal and 
particular, understood as contradictory aspects of the same thing, whose interplay is the content of the 
work” (156). 
For Leth to understand his difference from von Trier, and what’s more to fight it out with him, 
separates him from someone like Rainer who, since the 1980s, will usually claim, in agreement with her 
younger postmodern interpreters, that the main point of her work lies in its political motivations—to 
fight against the oppression of particular groups of people, or to point out other abuses of power—even 
though she is also always composing brilliantly ordered abstractions out of beautiful, nuanced, ordinary 
details in her performers and soundtracks. The theory driving the work that she published circa 1966 
is, furthermore, especially keyed to draw out and make available this ordinary texture as a “quality” for 
audiences to see and feel (Rainer 270).  
The two films by Leth that Brown discusses, Stopforbud (1963) and The Perfect Human (1967), have 
a lot in common with Rainer’s 1960s work insofar as they are tightly structured (visibly constrained at 
times) by both conventions and ideas, but are also, in their detail, by turns completely delightful and 
painful to witness. Watching The Perfect Human, I automatically start wanting to describe the male 
actor’s dancing and the strange things happening on his face while he is eating—they are hard to read 
and attractive because of that. Their quick changes suggest complex thoughts are happening; this is 
exciting and feels respectful of my capacity for sensuous attention and understanding. Brown’s writing 
registers similar felt responses: Powell’s expressions while performing are “apparently involuntary, 
occasionally grotesque, and anything but expressive in the usual sense”; and Claus Nissen’s 
performance in The Perfect Human of “thinly veiled vulnerability” is “projected by. . .a fleetingly troubled 
expression, an ambiguous grimace interrupting a love song” (157). Brown simply and beautifully sums 
up one interpretation of the work like this: “The film...concerns what subjectivity, irreducibly bound up 
in particularity and difference, looks like when perfection is imposed on it. . . .” (160). “What subjectivity 
looks like when perfection is imposed on it” is a wonderful, dialectical phrase, pointing strongly to the 
weird, impossible but necessary projects that art takes on. Notably avoided in this passage, though, is 
the fact that subjectivity comes off as fairly alienated in The Perfect Human, its vitality and sociality 
barely eking past the externalities through which it must appear. 
In his final argument, Brown insists that the details do not matter equally to the abstract structure. 
They are there to be “subordinated,” not exert reciprocal force in the dialectic: “any wounding detail can 
be integrated into the structure of the film, subsumed under its fundamental tension between ‘perfect’ 
and ‘human’” (157). Brown goes on, “the success or failure of Leth’s conversion of externally imposed 
contingency into internal consistency marks the strength or weakness of his response” (158). He makes 
a similar point earlier in the chapter about Stopforbud, which I will not review to save space (153-154). 
In his narrative of “conversion,” Brown asserts structure’s triumph over particularity in spite of the fact 
that he quotes Leth and summarizes his theory of art to be aiming for a dialectical play between 
physiology, wound, detail on the one side, and formal plan on the other. With this in mind, I would not 
say the particular habits of movement of Nissen or the facial expressions of Powell in Stopforbud are 
subordinated to the plan. I don’t believe either film expects me to dismiss these bodily nuances as mere 
illegible static. They are given a space within the structure and are thus dependent upon it in order to 
appear, but they are deeply affecting. It seems crucial to the success of the work of art, or “the workness 
of the work” (154), that I care about them, that I feel them as communicating something importantly 
small, that I feel something like love, but different, because I don’t actually care about the individual on 
the screen in a personal way at all. This ability to generate a kind of impersonal, abstract feeling is 
crucial to the structure convincing viewers it is trustworthy. It is necessary, in other words, for us to 
believe that it is structuring something real that it has had to accommodate in some ways. For Leth to 
make available feeling and form in this dialectical way is very different from the ironic, thwarting, 
defended, entombing approach to materials in Ray’s sculptures. 
Brown’s values place him in good company, though. I once asked Rainer about the display of 
particularity in her work, trying to convey my admiration for her ability to put the quirks of her 
performers’ habits on stage in an unchaotic way, and she replied with something like, “Well of course 
that’s there.” She was not interested in talking about it, presumably because for her, all dance offers 
the pleasure of individual performers. Her invention was the structure, and her intentions were political. 
Creating a space that could adequately accommodate the particular was not, for her, the important part 
of her intention. I always took that as a sign of her taking for granted the kind of sensitivity to nuanced 
material qualities that the Sixties generation took as a given, and though her response prevented us 
from connecting over her art, I was also envious of that “of course” attitude. From where I sat, born 
forty years later, it has become a capacity that I cannot count on in any given room full of people. Maybe 
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in the bubble of New York city, surrounded by other artists who had also internalized modern art so 
much they did not see what from it needed to be preserved while they were unseating the white 
patriarchs—maybe in that context, one could assume the capacity for ordinary sensuous understanding 
would not be lost, but out in critique-dominated academia in the early twenty-first century, the 
specialness of art’s being a concrete abstraction is something very few people seem to get besides art 
historians. Retrieving the specialness of art for contemporary thought would be in my view the best 
thing Brown’s and my generation (born in the 1970s, and mentored by the Sixties generation at the 
height of their mid-career glory) could contribute to this story. 
It may be that I am just asking whether art is a site for thinking in which some of the terms are 
understood primarily as qualities (with qualities taking a different form in our thinking than concepts). 
The most compelling quality in a work of art is usually at the site of a meeting of the artist’s intention 
and the material she did not create. This meeting between ideas and the world is simply how I 
understand practice. I worry that denying the importance of the ways the world’s particularity shows up 
in art—taking its place as a crucial part of the form—is like giving the whole realm of sensuousness and 
feeling over to spectacle, over to the logic of the commodity, because the profiteers are so good at 
manipulating us with it. Feeling can be instrumentalized, in other words, so we stop engaging with it, 
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